Clean Up & Recovery of NOLA
After Katrina, the clean up efforts were minimal to say the least. Directly after the storm, government officials were focused on determining the toxins in houses, in the water, and generally in the area. Numerous toxins were present in the flood water around homes and other infrastructure, putting those who were still in their homes at risk. Since some were stuck in their homes, it was vital to determine the toxicity and prioritize getting people out of their homes. By January 2006, 85% of public schools still had not reopened, half of the hospitals and bus routes were closed, and two thirds of food establishments were not opened in the metropolitan area. In early 2006, less than a year after Katrina, those who had evacuated were considering going back to their areas to begin rebuilding. People also wanted to restore the rich culture of New Orleans that had been lost in and after the storm. However, many areas were struggling to gain revenue. Because many residents had left their respective areas due to a lack of clean up assistance by the government, local businesses were struggling and there was no other income for residents.
Although local, state, and federal governments promised to provide aid to communities, they were all still lacking basic medical care and other services an entire year after the storm hit. Infrastructure was still in extreme disrepair, and local businesses continued to fail because of the failure to make living in the area safe. In order to help businesses and in an attempt to gain revenue, Governor Kathleen Blanco announced a plan to provide interest-free loans and $100 million in federal grants to the struggling small businesses in New Orleans. This did not have the outcome it was expected to, since houses were still damaged and uninhabitable, businesses could not get that many customers. Toxic debris was still prevalent around New Orleans, but landfills were overfilled and unable to hold more waste from clean up efforts. In 2009, four years after the storm, many residents discussed going back to their area to rebuild themselves since nothing had been done to their areas in all four years. This was only an option for people with money who could afford to rebuild on their own, but the majority of people who still needed to rebuild were poor, and in most cases black. For those who had evacuated either to the Superdome or elsewhere, they had lost insurance information, marriage licenses, and birth certificates. This prevented them from any rebuilding efforts, whether it be their homes or their livelihood.
Furthermore, most evacuees also did not have their medical records, so those who needed treatment often faced dangerous complications when medical attention was necessary. For those who returned to their homes, basic services and necessities were still nowhere to be found years after the storm. Overall Hurricane Katrina had created about 118 million cubic yards of debris in just five months, but because of overfilled landfills and rules for removing debris, not all of it could be removed. All of these issues with the clean up of Katrina mainly affected those who are black and living in New Orleans.
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In the Lower Ninth Ward, a predominantly black neighborhood, the average salary of residents was only $16,000 before the hurricane. Because of the poverty and racial differences, there are still areas with no rebuilt homes and only half of its original population is there. Similarly in the Seventh Ward, which is also a working-class black community, a decade after the storm it was only 60% rebuilt. In comparison, the government was primarily focused on the more affluent and tourist areas of New Orleans, and they were rebuilt the fastest while poorer and minority areas were neglected. For example, a prosperous white neighborhood called Lakeview had new homes built and new businesses created, making it look better than before the storm, even though they also suffered catastrophic damages from it. Additionally, New Orleans’ public hospital that helped many poorer residents prior to the storm had not been restored after the storm, even though it was needed more than ever.
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The biggest disparity in recovery efforts was the rebuilding of affordable housing. To put it simply, it was not rebuilt. A prominent housing project called the “Big Four” had thousands of affordable housing units. Even though most of the units were unscathed by the storm, the government decided to demolish the projects. The government started “Road Home,” the largest housing recovery program in United States history, where money was distributed based on the value of a home rather than the cost of rebuilding. Because of this, houses in white communities were valued more, so white residents received more money. Many New Orleans residents immediately complained that this system was extremely unfair, but it took five years for a federal judge to agree that the program was a form of racial discrimination. Since it took so long, though, government officials had already spent more than 98% of the $10.5 billion dollars in the Road Home program. From clean up to rebuilding, black New Orleans residents did not receive adequate or fair aid to recover from such a catastrophic event.
F.E.M.A
FEMA’s role during natural disasters is to coordinate food and water, medical supplies and services, search and rescue operations, and transportation. Unfortunately, this was not the reality during and after Hurricane Katrina.
After Hurricane Katrina hit, FEMA’s efforts were at best sub-par. FEMA ordered about $2.7 billion worth of travel trailers and mobile homes. The trailers and mobile homes issued by FEMA for the New Orleans residents that were displaced by Katrina were found to have unsafe levels of formaldehyde. People living in the trailers said “their eyes were burning, and they didn’t know what was going on.” The trailers and mobile homes had 40 times the recommended amount of formaldehyde
After Hurricane Katrina hit, FEMA’s efforts were at best sub-par. FEMA ordered about $2.7 billion worth of travel trailers and mobile homes. The trailers and mobile homes issued by FEMA for the New Orleans residents that were displaced by Katrina were found to have unsafe levels of formaldehyde. People living in the trailers said “their eyes were burning, and they didn’t know what was going on.” The trailers and mobile homes had 40 times the recommended amount of formaldehyde
The citizens of New Orleans and the United States were frustrated and disappointed with FEMA’s management during and after Hurricane Katrina. After Katrina hit, FEMA was not prepared for the extent of damage that was caused in New Orleans. It was reported that FEMA turned down personnel and supplies offered by police forces and other emergency responders. The Louisiana governor’s press secretary, Denise Bottcher said, “We wanted helicopters, food and water. They wanted to negotiate an organizational chart.” FEMA severely underestimated the power of Katrina which lead to losses of hundreds of lives.
After Hurricane Katrina, FEMA made a handful of structural improvements, starting with the leadership. The director of FEMA resigned due to his mismanagement of the situation. FEMA established Incident Management Assistance Teams, these teams arrive within 12 hours of an incident to help support local officials make decisions. A National Disaster Recovery Framework was also developed after Hurricane Katrina. The framework outlines, “coordination structures, leadership roles and responsibilities, and guidance for federal agencies, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and other partners involved in disaster planning and recovery.”
Reconstruction
In New Orleans there was a system of levees in place in order to protect the city from flooding in the common instances of a storm. With the unprecedented strength of Katrina, though, the levees did not withstand the power. The levees were designed by the Corps of Engineers, who were blamed for immense design flaws after the storm. Starting directly after the storm, the Corps of Engineers repaired 55 breaches of the levee system, and the work continued for years after. Because of the apparent need for a better system in New Orleans, the U.S. made a $14.45 billion investment in projects including a water pump station, levee and pump station improvements, the IHNC Lake Borgne Surge Barrier, and the Seabrook floodgate. All of these projects should theoretically make New Orleans more resilient to future storms, since they are inevitable.
In the storm, a major Louisiana bridge, the I-10 Twin Span Bridge, was destroyed. The Twin Span Bridge had more than 470 of its spans disconnected from their supports. 65 of which fell into the water. Because of its impact on Louisiana traffic, fixing the bridge was a top priority. Getting in and out of New Orleans and other parts of Louisiana is hard without the Twin Span Bridge. To fix the Twin Spans Bridge the government allocated $30.9 million dollars to repair it quickly. Most other bridges were the same, in the sense that their reparation was vital to the operation of New Orleans, so infrastructure repair was one of the government’s top priorities.
In the storm, a major Louisiana bridge, the I-10 Twin Span Bridge, was destroyed. The Twin Span Bridge had more than 470 of its spans disconnected from their supports. 65 of which fell into the water. Because of its impact on Louisiana traffic, fixing the bridge was a top priority. Getting in and out of New Orleans and other parts of Louisiana is hard without the Twin Span Bridge. To fix the Twin Spans Bridge the government allocated $30.9 million dollars to repair it quickly. Most other bridges were the same, in the sense that their reparation was vital to the operation of New Orleans, so infrastructure repair was one of the government’s top priorities.
Rebuilding NOLA
After disasters, the rich often get richer while the poor get poorer, and black residents lose wealth while white residents gain it. After Hurricane Katrina struck, federal aid was disproportionately allotted to the white and wealthy in New Orleans, and as a result, this population recovered at a quicker and more successful rate, while the city’s low-income and middle class populations-- largely black --were left in the dust.
A recent wave of recovery efforts has delivered a shinier face to New Orleans, but the new buildings, businesses, and infrastructure which have sprung up in the years following the storm act as a facade, concealing deeper issues that the city still has yet to resolve. Growing populations of young, educated, and socially-conscious city residents have opened up New Orleans to a slew of entrepreneurship and investment opportunities, but gentrification is occurring rapidly, and many of the city’s original residents have been unable to move back.
A recent wave of recovery efforts has delivered a shinier face to New Orleans, but the new buildings, businesses, and infrastructure which have sprung up in the years following the storm act as a facade, concealing deeper issues that the city still has yet to resolve. Growing populations of young, educated, and socially-conscious city residents have opened up New Orleans to a slew of entrepreneurship and investment opportunities, but gentrification is occurring rapidly, and many of the city’s original residents have been unable to move back.
After Katrina, the affordable housing market in New Orleans suffered serious blows. Due to, among other things, increased cost of production, devaluation of taxes, and labor shortages, housing production and the rebuilding of affordable housing fell far below projected numbers after the storm. Mixed-income housing, produced as part of a program created by the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency to encourage investment by private developers into low-income housing deals, replaced the four major housing projects that existed before Katrina, and by 2009, residents occupied only 1,750 public housing units, compared with 5,148 before the storm. Large amounts of federal aid were directed towards the city to rebuild and recover after the disaster, and the state ended up with over $1 billion in affordable housing tax credits, but a report by the Bureau of Government Research portrayed the massive subsidies for low- and mixed-income housing as detrimental to New Orleans’s economy and an overall burden to the city. Closely following the publication of this report, the State Bond Commission placed a moratorium on the approval of all new bonds, which prevented further development of affordable housing, as the government had ceased for the time being to raise money for subsidization of housing.
Years of racial inequality and segregation resulted in predominantly black neighborhoods being more likely to be situated in low-lying areas where damage caused by flooding and other aspects of the storm were exponentially greater than that experienced in neighborhoods built on higher ground, which were, incidentally, primarily home to the city’s white residents. As a result, African-American homeowners were more than three times more likely to be living in flooded areas than white homeowners. Moreover, recovery programs, such as the federal Road Home rebuilding program, left out the majority of black families by distributing payments based on the value of damaged properties-- this value generally being much lower in black neighborhoods.
In addition, following disasters, it is harder for low-income families to successfully apply for and receive aid because they might lack the time or resources to do so, and rigid application requirements render a lot of families ineligible. FEMA disproportionately grants aid to higher-income families, and the effects of this were felt in New Orleans in the wake of Katrina, when low-income households are disproportionately African American.
To this day, there are 100,000 fewer African Americans living in New Orleans than before Katrina, whereas the white population has been almost completely successful in the restoration of its numbers. After the storm, the gap between the median income of African Americans and whites increased by 18%, and by 2013, African Americans comprised only 59% of New Orleans’ population, from 66% in 2005. Failure to create subsidized and affordable housing, coupled with unfair distribution of aid has resulted in the rebuilding of New Orleans in such a way that has marginalized and left behind a population that was integral to its rich cultural history.
To this day, there are 100,000 fewer African Americans living in New Orleans than before Katrina, whereas the white population has been almost completely successful in the restoration of its numbers. After the storm, the gap between the median income of African Americans and whites increased by 18%, and by 2013, African Americans comprised only 59% of New Orleans’ population, from 66% in 2005. Failure to create subsidized and affordable housing, coupled with unfair distribution of aid has resulted in the rebuilding of New Orleans in such a way that has marginalized and left behind a population that was integral to its rich cultural history.
Evacuee Migration
After Katrina, many people were promised the ability to return to their previous housing styles and locations. Unfortunately, that wasn't the case. Ten years after Katrina, in 2013, the black population of NOLA lost about 100,000 blacks that were part of the population in 2000 of which those people fluctuated between different income levels. The white population on the other hand lost 11,000 people, but the white people who remain are still wealthier than the small amount of blacks that could afford to return due to the fact that the median income of black households is 54% lower than the income of white households.
Many evacuees from Katrina who lived along the Gulf Coast can no longer afford returning due to a few major reasons such as:
Many evacuees from Katrina who lived along the Gulf Coast can no longer afford returning due to a few major reasons such as:
- The city did away with public housing
- The city wasn’t committed to reconstructing the rental units that were lost
- The city wasn’t committed to giving residents affordable housing
- The authorities didn’t distribute enough money for homeowners to rebuild or rebuild in a timely manner
- Due to the issues that resulted from this problem resulted in the permanent displacement of many former residents.
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Even with the drastic change in population and diversity, inequities persisted. In 2000, the child poverty rate was about 40%, the general poverty rate being about 30%. These rates have not changed. Crime in communities still prove to be just as bad as it had been in the past. Although the local and federal governments have made efforts to rectify the criminal justice system in the city, they received various results that of which being that while the population of the city’s prison depleted significantly, the rate of incarceration doubled the national average.
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These issues still have an effect on New Orleans today. Since the public housing units weren’t replaced, there are fewer low income public housing apartments compared to the amount that existed in 2005 before Katrina. The main complexes, also known as “The Big Four,” contained about 4500 units, over 3000 being occupied prior to the damage wrought on the city by Katrina.The New Orleans Housing Authority reported having 1925 total public housing apartments available for low income people in 2015. That number of housing units available was over 3000 housing units less than the amount available before the storm and of those newer households, thousands of former public housing residents in New Orleans were not provided a home to return to. However, although some housing may exist, they have become more costly, seeing how the cost of a two bedroom apartment has risen by 40% in the following decade after Katrina which prevents former residents from being able to afford housing in their former neighborhoods, leaving them permanently displaced.
A solution to help temporarily displaced evacuees, The Road Home project was formed. The Road Home is a project that gave a total of $9 billion dollars to 130,000 homeowners who had their property destroyed in Katrina. 119,000 of the 130,000 recipients promised to reconstruct and return to living in their homes within a time span of 3 years. People questioned the authenticity of that promise. As a result, after the 3 years, almost all of the recipients have held up to their promise. According to state officials, about 6% of their grantees, fewer than 7,000, have failed to accomplish what they promised they would. The program ended on March 1, 2018.